Very few exact solutions are known for the monopolist's k-item n-buyer maximum revenue problem with additive valuation in which k, n > 1 and the buyers i have independent private distributions F j i on items j. In this paper we derive exact formulas for the maximum revenue when k = 2 and F j i are any IID distributions on support of size 2, for both the dominant-strategy (DIC) and the Bayesian (BIC) implementations. The formulas lead to the simple characterization that, the two implementations have identical maximum revenue if and only if selling-separately is optimal for the distribution. Our results also give the first demonstration, in this setting, of revenue gaps between the two implementations. For instance, if k = n = 2 and P r{X F = 1} = P r{X F = 2} = 
Introduction
A monopolist wants to sell k items to n buyers with the aim to maximize revenue, where buyers i have private (additive 1 ) valuations t j i of items j described by independent distributions F j i over the range [0, ∞). How should the optimal mechanisms be designed?
Myersons's classical paper [34] elegantly and completely solved the problem for the single item (k = 1) setting. For multiple items (k > 1), the problem is much more complex with an extensive literature (see Related Work below). Much progress has been made, but many interesting questions remain open.
In this paper we focus on two such questions, both arising in connection with certain features of Myersons's solution. Note that for k = 1 Myerson's theory in many situations leads to explicit formulas for the optimal revenue, in addition to good intuitive understanding of how optimality arises. For k > 1, in the single buyer (n = 1) case, there is a rich collection of sophisticated results (e.g., Manelli and Vincent [29] , Hart and Nisan [23] , Hart and Reny [25] , Pavlov [35] , Wang and Tang [40] , Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias [21] [22], Giannakopoulos [19] [20] ), where explicit expressions for optimal revenue are obtained for certain discrete and continuous distributions. However, for k > 1 and n > 1, there do not seem to be any interesting results of this kind in the literature.
Question Q1. For k > 1 and n > 1, can we obtain explicit expressions of the optimal revenue for interesting families of distributions?
We turn to a second question. In auction theory, and more generally mechanism design theory, there are two standard versions of how the players' behavior is modeled, which translate into constraints on the classes of allowable mechanisms known respectively as dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) and Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms. Formally, the BIC constraints look much weaker than the DIC constraints. It is thus a remarkable feature of Myersons's theory for the singleitem auctions that exactly the same maximum revenue is achieved by the BIC mechanisms and the DIC mechanisms. Can this equivalence hold for k > 1?
Question Q2. For k > 1, can Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms ever produce strictly more revenue than the dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) mechanisms?
There is a substantial literature on the DIC versus BIC question (see Related Work below). When the independence condition on the distributions F j i is dropped, then the answer to Question 2 is known. Cremer and Mclean [15] showed BIC can generate unbounded more revenue than DIC, when F j i are correlated across buyers even for k = 1. Recently, Tang and Wang [39] showed in some instance with k > 1, BIC can generate strictly more revenue than DIC, when F j i are correlated across items. There are other examples (e.g. Gershkov et al. [18] ) where DIC and BIC are shown to be inequivalent in revenue (and other attributes), but their models are farther away from our model under consideration here.
In this paper we address questions Q1 and Q2. As a contribution in the direction of Q1, we derive exact formulas for the maximum revenue for both DIC and BIC implementations for k = 2 and any n > 1, where the 2n distributions F j i are IID with a common F of support size 2. As a by-product, these formulas give an answer to Q2, showing the BIC optimal revenue expression to be strictly greater than that of DIC for a broad range of parameters. In fact the formulas lead to the simple characterization that, the two implementations have identical maximum revenue if and only if selling-separately is optimal for the distribution. For instance, if k = n = 2 and P r{X F = 1} = P r{X F = 2} = 1 2 , then the maximum revenue in the Bayesian implementation exceeds that in the dominant-strategy by exactly 2%. A natural extension to the continuous case shows that the same 2% gap holds for the uniform distribution over [a, a + 1] ∪ [2a, 2a + 1] as a → ∞. We also remark that our result complements nicely a result in Yao [41] where the BIC maximum revenue is shown to be always upper bounded by a constant factor of the DIC maximum revenue.
Related Work
Much progress has been made on the computational aspects of multi-item auctions in models like the one discussed here. The intrinsic complexity of computing the optimal revenue has been investigated (e.g. [14] [16]; efficient algorithms have been found in a variety of circumstances (e.g. [7] The DIC versus BIC question falls in the domain of Implementation Theory, which is a central subject in mechanism design with a large literature (see e.g. [31] [32] [33] [36]). Most related to our work, beyond references mentioned in previous paragraphs, are Manelli and Vincent [30] , Gershkov et al. [18] , which present equivalence results of DIC and BIC beyond revenue equivalence for models with one-dimensional types, and discuss the limitations of such equivalence results.
Preliminaries

Basic Concepts
Let F be a multi-dimensional distribution on [0, ∞) nk . Consider the k-item n-buyer auction problem where the valuation n × k matrix t = (t j i ) is drawn from F. Each buyer i has t i ≡ (t 1 i , t 2 i , · · · , t k i ) as his valuations of the k items. We also refer to t i as buyer i's type, and t as the type profile of the buyers (or profile for short). For convenience, let t −i denote the valuations of all buyers except buyer i; that is, t −i = (t i ′ | i ′ = i). Note that t j , the j-th column of the matrix t, contains the valuations of all the buyers on item j.
A mechanism M specifies an allocation q(t) = (q j i (t)) ∈ [0, ∞) nk , where q j i (t) denotes the probability that item j is allocated to buyer i when t = (t j i ) is reported as the type profile to M by the buyers. We require that n i=1 q j i (t) ≤ 1 for all j, so that the total probability of allocating item j is at most 1. M also specifies a payment s i (t) ∈ (−∞, ∞) for buyer i.
The utility u i (t) for buyer i is defined to be t i · q i (t) − s i (t), where t i · q i (t) stands for the inner product
.e. the utility buyer i would obtain if he has type t i but reports to the seller as t ′ i . The expected utilityū i (t i ) for buyer i is defined to be
). The following formulas are well known:
Two kinds of mechanisms have been widely studied, referred to as Dominant-strategy and Bayesian implementations as specified below.
A. Dominant-strategy Implementation IR conditions: u i (t) ≥ 0 for all i and t. Let s(x) = n i=1 s i (x) be the total payments received by the seller. For any mechanism M on F, let M (F) = E x∼F (s(x)) be the (expected) revenue received by the seller from all buyers. The optimal revenue is defined as REV D (F) = sup M M (F) when M ranges over all the IR-DIC mechanisms. Similarly, in the Bayesian model, the optimal revenue is defined as REV B (F) = sup M M (F) where M ranges over all the BIR-BIC mechanisms. As a benchmark for comparison, let SREV (F) stand for the revenue yielded when each item is sold separately by using Myerson's optimal mechanism [34] .
Hierarchy Mechanism
Consider an n-buyer 1-item auction. A hierarchy allocation scheme H is specified by a mapping Rank : T → R ∪ {∞}. Given a type t ∈ (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ), scheme H allocates the item uniformly among the set of buyers i with the smallest ranking. If Rank(t i ) = ∞ for all i, then no allocation will be made to any buyer. For convenience, we also use the notation H = [τ 11 , . . . , τ 1a 1 ; τ 21 , . . . , τ 2a 2 ; . . . ; τ ℓ1 , . . . , τ ℓa ℓ ] with the understanding Rank(τ dm ) = d for all 1 ≤ d ≤ ℓ, 1 ≤ m ≤ a d , and Rank(t) = ∞ for any type t not listed among τ dm .
In an n-buyer k-item auction, a hierarchy mechanism M uses an allocation function specified by a k-tuple H = (H 1 , H 2 , · · · , H k ), where each H j is a hierarchy allocation scheme to be used for item j; also a utility function u i (t) for each buyer i needs to be specified for M . Note that the payment for buyer i is determined by
The concept of hierarchy mechanism was raised in Border [4] [5] for one item, and later for multiitems in Cai et al. [7] in connection with Border's Theorem and efficiently computing optimal auctions. Here we only need the concept as a convenient way to describe some of our proposed mechanisms. More in-depth discussions of hierarchy mechanisms can be found in [4] [5] [7] .
Main Results
In this paper, we solve for REV B (F) and REV B (F) in the n-buyer, 2-item case when F consists of 2n IID's of a common F with support size 2. Any such F can be specified by a 4-tuple δ = (n, p, a, b) where n ≥ 2 is an integer, 0 < p < 1, and 0 ≤ a < b. Let F δ denote the valuation distribution for the n-buyer 2-item auction, where the distributions F j i for buyer i and item j are independent and identical (IID) copies of random variables X defined by P r{X = a} = p and P r{X = b} = 1 − p. Assuming additive valuation on items for each buyer, we are interested in determining REV D (F δ ) and REV B (F δ ), the maximum revenue achievable under IR-DIC and BIR-BIC, respectively, for distribution F δ . We find two benchmarks relevant, SREV (F δ ) and s b = 2(1 − p n )b: the former is the revenue obtained by selling separately each item using Myerson's optimal mechanism [34] ; the latter is the revenue by selling separately each item at price b.
The Main Theorem
For any real-valued function G, we use G + to denote the nonnegative function defined as G + = max{G, 0}. 
Application to Continuous Distributions
The results in the Main Theorem have implications on the maximum revenue for continuous distributions if the latter can be well approximated by F δ . As an application, let λ > 1, a > 1 λ−1 , and let
We can regard F δ , where δ = (n, p, 1, λ), as a normalized discrete approximation of F.
Corollary 2 is proved by an extension of our proof of the Main Theorem to the continuous setting (details omitted here).
Remark 3. There are general high-precision approximation theorems in the literature (e.g. see [9] [17] [27] [38]) connecting continuous and discrete distributions for the BIC maximum revenue auction. Our derivation of Corollary 2 does not rely on such general theorems.
We consider an illustrative example of Corollary 2 where n = 2. Let G a = (F j i | i, j ∈ {1, 2}), where Corollary 3. For a ≥ 20, the BIC maximum revenue for G a strictly exceeds its DIC maximum revenue. In fact, we have for a ≥ 6,
Optimal Mechanisms
The optimal revenue r D (δ) and r B (δ) stated in the Main Theorem can be realized, respectively, by the IR-DIC mechanism M D,δ and the IR-BIC mechanism M B,δ defined below. First, we name the characteristic functions for the three intervals where the individual terms of r D (δ), r B (δ) are non-zero. The subscripts in α p,a,b , γ p,a,b , β p,a,b can be dropped when p, a, b are clear from the context. Note that, if desired, the formulas for r D (δ) and r B (δ) can be written using α, β, γ as multipliers in place of the notation G + ≡ max{G, 0}.
Definition 3.
In what follows, the term profile refers to a profile in the support of F δ , a type refers to a type in {a, b} × {a, b}. For any profile t and j ∈ {1, 2}, we say t j is cheap if t j i = a for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (we also say item j is cheap); otherwise t j is non-cheap. Call a profile t 1-cheap if t has exactly 1 cheap item. We use I(t) to denote the subset of buyers i with t i = (a, a), that is, only excluding those who value both items at a. Note that, if t is 1-cheap, then |I(t)| is equal to the number of b's in t (and all appearing in the same column).
We now define mechanism M D,δ and M B,δ below, in the form of hierarchy mechanisms. First divide the range (a, ∞) of b into 4 subintervals:
Case 2. b ∈ I 2 . Use the allocation function (H 1 , H 2 ) where
Case 3. b ∈ I 3 . If t = (t i , t −i ) with t −i being the lowest profile (a, a) n−1 , then offer items 1 and 2 to buyer i as a bundle at price a + b. Otherwise, use the allocation function (H 1 , H 2 ) where
The payment of M (F δ ) is determined by the following utility function: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, t = (t i , t −i ),
Remark 4. Strictly speaking, M D,δ in Case 3 is not a hierarchy mechanism. We abuse the term slightly for convenience. We observe that when b ∈ I 4 , M D,δ can be described as selling each item separately at price b with a particular tie-breaking rule as dictated by the Case 4 allocation function (H 1 , H 2 ). When b ∈ I 3 , M D,δ can be described as follows: if t = (t i , t −i ) with t −i = (a, a) n−1 , then offer items 1 and 2 to buyer i as a bundle at price a + b; otherwise sell each item separately at price b with a particular tie-breaking rule as dictated by the Case 3 allocation function (H 1 , H 2 ). In both Case 1 and 2, the payment is defined by the same utility function u i (t i , t −i ) as in M D,δ with only one exception: if t i = (b, b) and t −i is 1-cheap, then let u 1 ((b, b), (1, b) ) ≥ u 1 ((1, b), (1, b) ) + (b − 1)q 1 1 ((1, b), (1, b) ).
Mechanism
u i (t i , t −i ) = 1 2 (b − a) β 1 + |I(t −i )| .
DIC Maximum Revenue
In this section we give a proof outline of the Main Theorem for the dominant strategy implementation:
We begin with a general discussion applicable to any mechanism. Let M be a mechanism with allocation q j i and utility u i . We separate out the allocation of cheap items from non-cheap items. Thus, define q ′ j i (t) = q j i (t)η j (t) where η j (t) = 1 if item j is cheap, and η j (t) = 0 if j is non-cheap. Note that the welfare of the buyers from the allocation of cheap items is a · i,j,t P r{t}q ′ j i (t), while the welfare from the non-cheap items is i,j,t P r{t}(1 − η j (t))q Basic Formula. For any mechanism M , we have
where Q = i,j,t P r{t}q ′ j i (t) and U = i,t P r{t}u i (t). Definition 4. For any set S of profiles, let Q(S) = t∈S P r{t} i,j q ′ j i (t), and U (S) = t∈S P r{t} i u i (t). To make use of the Basic Formula, we partition the profiles that can possibly contribute to the Q term into three subsets S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , and then use the IR-DIC Conditions to show that the U term (utility obtained by buyers) is greater than a certain linear combination of Q(S 0 ), Q(S 1 ), Q(S 2 ). The Basic Formula then yields r D (δ) as an upper bound to M (F δ ).
Definition 5. Let S 0 = {(a, a) n } be the set containing a single element, namely, the lowest profile. Let S 1 be the set of 1-cheap profiles t satisfying |I(t)| = 1. Let S 2 be the set of 1-cheap profiles t satisfying |I(t)| ≥ 2.
Recall that p 0 = p 2n , p 1 = 2np 2n−1 (1 − p), p 2 = 2p n (1 − p n − np n−1 (1 − p)). They have the following interpretation as can be easily verified.
Fact 3. P r{t ∈ S ℓ } = p ℓ for ℓ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where t is distributed according to F δ .
Proof. Any profile in S 1 or S 2 has exactly one cheap item, and the (only) profile in S 0 has two cheap items. Lemma 1 then follows from Fact 3.
Lemma 2.
Proof. It follows from Fact 2 that Q = Q(S 0 ) + Q(S 1 ) + Q(S 2 ). Lemma 2 then follows from the Basic Formula.
Lemma 1, 2 set the stage. We are ready to invoke the incentive compatibility requirements to prove Theorem 1. This setting is also useful in the next section when we prove the BIC part of the Main Theorem.
Upper Bound to DIC Revenue
We prove Theorem 1 in this subsection. The key is to prove the following proposition. Proposition 1. Any IR-DIC mechanism M must satisfy the following inequality:
We first show that Theorem 1 follows from Proposition 1. It follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 that, for any IR-DIC mechanism M , we have
With no negative terms, the above expression together with Lemma 1 immediately yield Theorem 1. Thus to establish Theorem 1, it suffices to prove Proposition 1.
Definition 6. For any 1 ≤ i, i ′ ≤ n, let τ i,i ′ be the profile t such that t 1 i = t 2 i ′ = b and all other t j ℓ = a; let τ i,0 be the profile t with t 1 i = b and all other t j ℓ = a; let τ 0,i ′ be the profile t with t 2 i ′ = b and all other t j ℓ = a; let τ 0,0 = (a, a) n .
Fact 4. S
Definition 7. For any t ∈ S 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, define τ t,i as follows: let item j (j ∈ {1, 2}) be the cheap item for t; define τ t,i = t ′ where t ′ j i = b and
are disjoint sets of profiles containing no cheap items. From Fact 5 and the IR Conditions, we have
We now utilize the DIC-conditions to establish the following lemma relating the U and Q values on different types. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The DIC-conditions require that, for all t i , t ′ i , t −i ,
We only need a subset of these conditions where t i > t ′ i . In such cases, we can use q ′ j i instead of q j i and write DIC-Conditions: For all t i > t ′ i and any t −i ,
To prove Eq. 6, consider t i ∈ {(b, a), (a, b)}, t ′ i = (a, a). We have
By Fact 4 we have
Using Eq. 10 and the IR Conditions u i ′ (t) ≥ 0, we obtain
This proves Eq. 6, the first inequality in the Lemma.
We now prove Eq. 7. Write
We prove Eq. 11 for x = L; the case for x = R is similar.
Now consider the DIC-Conditions (Eq. 9) for (t i , t −i ) = τ i,i ′ and (t ′ i , t −i ) = τ 0,i ′ , which gives
From Eqs. 12 and 13, we obtain
This proves Eq. 11, thus completing the proof of Eq. 7.
We now prove Eq. 8, the third inequality of Lemma 3. By definition
Now observe that the DIC-Condition Eq. 9 for τ t,i ∈ S ′ 2 and t ∈ S 2 implies 2
From Eq. 14 and 15, we obtain
This proves Eq. 8. We have completed the proof of the Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 can be straightforwardly derived from Lemma 3, Eq. 5, and the IR conditions U (S 0 ), U (S 2 ) ≥ 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 1 and hence Theorem 1.
Realizing DIC Revenue
We turn to the proof of Theorem 2. We need to prove two statements. The proof of Statement 1 is given in the Appendix. For the rest of this subsection, we prove Statement 2. Here is the top level view of the proof. To show that the upper bound on revenue from Theorem 1 can be achieved, we demonstrate that several critical inequalities involved in the upper bound proof can be replaced by equalities. First, for mechanism M D,δ , it can be verified that Eqs. 3, 4 now are equalities, while Eq. 2 is replaced by Q(S 0 ) = 2αp 0 , Q(S 1 ) = βp 1 , Q(S 2 ) = γp 2 . Combining these equalities gives us M D,δ (F δ ) = r D (δ). We now give the details.
. Proof. From Eq. 1, we know that u i (t) = 0 may occur only when t = (t i , t −i ) and one of the following is valid: (a) t −i = (a, a) n−1 and t i = (a, a); (b) t −i is 1-cheap and t i = (b, b). In case (a) we have t ∈ S 1 ∪ S ′ 1 , and in case (b) we have t ∈ S ′ 2 . Fact 7.
Proof. For the (only) profile t in S 0 , the allocation function of M D,δ specifies i,j q ′ j i (t) = 2 if b < v 1 , and 0 otherwise. Similarly, for any profile t ∈ S 1 , i,j q ′ j i (t) = 1 if b < v 3 , and 0 otherwise; and for any profile t ∈ S 2 , i,j q ′ j i (t) = 1 if b < v 2 , and 0 otherwise. This is exactly the assertion of Fact 7. Lemma 1'.
Proof. Follows immediately from Fact 3 and 7.
Lemma 2'.
Proof. As under M D,δ all the non-cheap items are allocated in full, the Basic Formula achieves equality, i.e.
, and from Fact 6 we have
Proof. To prove Eq. 18, note that using M D,δ 's utility definition in Eq. 1 we have
where we used Lemma 1' and Fact 3 in the last step. This proves Eq. 18.
To prove Eq. 19, note that for any
Making use of Lemma 1' and Fact 3, we obtain Eq. 19.
To prove Eq. 20, note that for any t ∈ S 2 , 1 ≤ i, i ′ ≤ n we have from Eq. 1
It follows that
where we used Lemma 1' and Fact 3 in the last step. This proves Eq. 20. We have finished the proof of Lemma 3'.
From Lemma 2' and 3', we have
Use Lemma 1' and simplify the above equation, we obtain
This proves Statement 2, and completes the proof of Theorem 2.
BIC Maximum Revenue
In this section we give a proof of the Main Theorem for the Bayesian implementation:
Theorem 4 M B,δ is IR-BIC, and M B,δ (F δ ) = r B (δ).
The proofs of Theorem 3 and 4 follows the same top-level outline as the proof of Theorem 1 and 2. Lemma 1 and 2 proved in Section 4 are valid for any mechanism M , and will also be the starting point for the BIC proof.
Upper Bound to BIC Revenue
We prove Theorem 3 in this subsection. The key is to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Any BIR-BIC mechanism M must satisfy the following inequality:
Theorem 3 can be derived from Lemma 1, 2 and Proposition 2 in exactly the same way as Theorem 1's derviation from Lemma 1, 2 and Proposition 1, and will not be repeated here. It remains to prove Proposition 2.
We use a subset of the BIR-BIC Conditions in our proof; these conditions are listed below for easy reference.
(a) BIR Condition: For each i,ū
(b) BIC Condition: For each i,ū
The plan is to use Eqs. 23-27 to obtain a lower bound on U in terms of Q(S 0 ), Q(S 1 ) and Q(S 2 ).
Proof. Immediate from Eqs. 23-25.
Proof. Adding up Eqs. 26 and 27, we obtain
where we have used the fact that q ′ 2 i ((a, b), t −i ) = q ′ 1 i ((b, a), t −i ) = 0 for all t −i . Lemma 5 now follows by using Lemma 4 on Eq. 28.
We now express U as a convex combination of the left-hand sides of Eq 23, Lemma 4 and 5, and obtain a lower bound in terms of Q(S ℓ ):
where
and
Separating out the t −i = (a, a) n−1 term in Eq. 30, we obtain
where we have used Fact 2.
It follows from Eqs. 30-32 that
This proves Proposition 2, and completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Realizing BIC Revenue
To prove Theorem 4, it suffices to prove the following two statements. 
Lemma 1".
). All the above statements are straightforward to prove. Finally, Lemma 3' is modified to the following:
The proof of Eqs. 33-34 is exactly the same as in the proof of Eqs. 18-19 in Lemma 3'. The proof of Eq. 35 is also similar to the proof of Eq. 20 in Lemma 3', except that Eq. 21 should be replaced by
Proceeding as before, we obtain instead of Eq. 22,
This proves Eq. 35, and completes the proof of Lemma 3".
It follows from Lemmas 2", 3" that
Use Lemma 1 ′′ and simplify, we obtain
This proves Statement 4, and completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Thus, to verify A2-A5 is the same as to verify the following inequalities, which are obviously true:
By the definition of M D,δ , it is easy to verify that
To verify A2-A5 is the same as to verify the following inequalities, which are obviously true:
Symmetric to Case B, we have
To verify A2-A5 is equivalent to verifying the following inequalities, which are obviously true:
We have so far treated all the cases when t 1 has at least one cheap item. We divide the rest by whether t −1 has an i with t i = (b, b). Let ℓ(t −1 ) be the number of such i's. 
To verify A2-A5 is equivalent to verifying the following inequalities, which are obviously true: We have shown that A2-A5 hold in all cases. This completes the proof of Statement 1.
B. Proof of Statement 3
We prove Statement 3 from Section 5.2.
Statement 3. M B,δ is IR and BIC.
Proof. Again, we assume b > a = 1 without loss of generality. Mechanism M B,δ is obviously IR, as the utility function for M B,δ is defined to be always non-negative. M B,δ is also clearly BIC (and in fact DIC) if b ∈ [v 3 , ∞), as in this case M B,δ = M D,δ which has been shown to be DIC in Appendix A. Therefore, in our proof, we can assume that b ∈ (1, v 3 ) and, in this situation, the parameters satisfy α ∈ {0, 1} and β = 1.
The BIC Conditions can be written as: for all i, t i , t ′ i ,
As M B,δ is symmetric among items and among buyers, to show that M B,δ is BIC, it is sufficient to prove the following subset of inequalities: 
Fact A1.q 1 (t 1 ) ≥q 1 (t ′ 1 ) if t 1 ≥ t ′ 1 .
Proof. The allocation function used by M B,δ is consistent with the partial order on the types. Thus, if t 1 ≥ t ′ 1 , we have q 1 (t 1 , t −1 ) ≥ q 1 (t ′ 1 , t −1 ) for any t −1 . This impliesq 1 (t 1 ) ≥q 1 (t ′ 1 ). 1, 0) ·q 1 (1, 1) .
Adding up the above inequalities, we obtain Eq. A9.
It remains to prove Eq. A10. We first establish the following Fact: But this is true by Fact A3. This proves Eq. A10, and completes the proof of Statement 3.
